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EMINENT DOMAIN: PRIVATE CORPORATIONS AND
THE PUBLIC USE LIMITATION
"Though no logical limits are evident in the cases, it nonetheless
remains to be seen how far courts will be willing to go in al-
lowing local development authorities to condemn property for
commercial purposes.',
I. INTRODUCTION
Under the federal and state constitutions, property may not be
taken for public use without just compensation. A corollary of this
constitutional right is that private property may not be taken for private
use. Recent state court decisions on this public use requirement illus-
trate a growing controversy surrounding the exercise of eminent do-
main to meet the needs of private corporations, when the public will
benefit as a result.
This comment examines the history of the public use requirement:
its origins, its scope, and particular public uses controlled by private
corporations.2 Cases demonstrating the modem conflict are analyzed
within a topical framework emphasizing the precedent and recurrent
reasoning. The conclusion is preceded by various proposals for ad-
dressing the problem of private corporate development as a public use.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Origins
The origins of the public use limitation are even harder to trace
than those of eminent domain itself.3 Apparently, the Roman Empire
recognized the sovereign power to take private property,4 but it was not
until the seventeenth century that the legal philosopher, Hugo Grotius,
coined the term "eminent domain."5 The public use limitation is a
more recent development in the law.6 Although Grotius, Pufendorf,
Bynkershoek, and other civil law writers contested the purposes for
which property could be taken, prior to the establishment of the Ameri-
can colonies, the public use limitation was never specifically addressed
by common law courts and scholars.7
The modem idea of a public use limitation on sovereign takings
1. Meidinger, The "'Public Uses" of Eminent Domain.- History and Policy, 11 ENVT'L
L. 1, 35 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Meidinger].
2. This comment will not discuss the just compensation requirement. For a thor-
ough discussion ot this subject, see 3 P. NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN
(3d rev. ed. 1979).
3. Berger, The Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain, 57 OR. L. REV. 203, 204
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Berger]; see Meidinger, supra note 1, at 4.
4. 1 P. NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.12 (3d rev. ed. 1979) [hereinaf-
ter cited as 1 NICHOLS].
5. Id at 14 (citing H. GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI ET PAds 20 (1625)). The legal
terminology is derived from the Latin phrase dominium eminens.
6. Berger, supra note 3, at 204.
7. Meidinger, supra note 1, at 16.
evolved slowly during the late American colonial period. When the
Declaration of Independence was signed in 1776, only Pennsylvania
and Virginia had constitutional provisions relating to public use.' The
historical records are unclear as to why this restraint on governmental
power received so little attention. 9 One hypothesis explaining the dis-
interest is that arbitrary and oppressive condemnation was not a serious
abuse charged against the Crown or Parliament.' 0
James Madison's public use provision in the draft of the Constitu-
tion was slightly modified before ratification." The provision was at-
tached as the final clause of the fifth amendment to the Bill of Rights:
"nor shall property be taken for public use, without just compensa-
tion.""2 Similar public use clauses were later adopted in various forms
in state constitutions. 13 Although there was no express prohibition
against taking property for private use in the federal or state constitu-
tions, most courts viewed the corollary as arising by direct implication
from the public use clauses."' Other courts maintained that the appli-
cable due process clause was the constitutional restraint invalidating
private takings. 1"
The source of the prohibition against private takings was not de-
bated as extensively as the meaning of public use. Although little con-
troversy arose concerning the definition of public use in the post-
revolutionary era,' 6 that period of relative tranquility was the classic
example of the calm before the storm. The transportation and indus-
trial revolutions dramatically altered the face of the American conti-
nent throughout the 1800's and well into the present century. As
8. Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 553, 591
(1972). The public use provisions did not refer exclusively to the states' taking
power. Id; see PA. CONST. of 1776, DECL. OF RIGHTS art. VII; VA. CONST. of
1776, BILL OF RIGHTS § 6.
9. Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 553, 591
(1972).
10. Meidinger, supra note 1, at 17. Other theories are that the drafters never contem-
plated that property could be taken for other than public use or that they may
have assumed that takings for private use were permissible. Id
11. Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 553, 595
(1972). The modification of Madison's draft suggests the framers' intent to dilute
the original language of the public use provision, "No person shall be ... obliged
to relinquish his property, where it may be necessary for public use, without a just
compensation." Id
12. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
13. E.g., MD. CONST. art. III, § 40; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 30.
14. 2A P. NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 7.112] (3d rev. ed. 1979) [here-
inafter cited as 2A NICHOLS]; see, e.g., Arnsperger v. Crawford, 101 Md. 247, 251,
61 A. 413, 415 (1905).
15. 2A NICHOLS, supra note 14, § 7.1[3]; see, e.g., Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Nebraska, 164
U.S. 403, 417 (1896); Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill 140, 145 (N.Y. 1843).
16. Comment, Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain. An Advance Requiem, 58
YALE L.J. 599, 600 (1949) [hereinafter cited as Requiem]. During that period, the
functions of federal and state government were far more limited and public land
was abundant. Id
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governmental and commercial organizations acquired the preciously
coveted condemnation authority, there was a striking increase in the
number of takings. 7 Consequently, a deluge of litigation ensued.'
8
Courts and legal commentators that have undertaken the monumental
task of exploring the legal history of the public use requirement agree
that the development of the case law has been chaotic.' 9 Nevertheless,
from the complexity and confusion a few general patterns emerge.
B. Narrow View or Broad View
During the nineteenth century a definitional schism arose as state
and, later, federal20 tribunals embraced either a narrow or broad view
of public use.' Essentially the narrow view stated that for property to
be taken for public use, it must actually be used by the public.22 New
York was the first state to articulate the "use by the public" test in
1837.23 In response to the sudden increase in condemnations for trans-
portation and industrial purposes, many state courts adopted the nar-
row view.24
The narrow view gradually lost its initial support and has been
relegated almost to the status of a legal relic.25 The United States
Supreme Court contributed to the demise of the narrow view in Mount
Vernon Woodberry Cotton Duck Co. v. Alabama Interstate Power Co. 
26
In that case, Justice Holmes rejected "use by the public" as the appro-
17. Id
18. Eg., Owensboro v. McCormick, 581 S.W.2d 3, 5 (Ky. 1979). "It would extend
this opinion beyond tolerable limits if we attempted to analyze the many Ken-
tucky cases that have decided in particular instances whether condemnation
sought was primarily for a public use." Id
19. Requiem, supra note 16, at 605-06. The case law is "irreconcilable in its inconsis-
tency, confusing in its detail and defiant of all attempts at classification." Id
20. The federal courts did not review condemnations under the federal government's
recognized condemnation authority until the 1870's. Meidinger, supra note 1, at
30. The first federal taking case reviewed by the Supreme Court was Kohl v.
United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875) (condemnation by federal government for postal
road upheld).
21. 2A NICHOLS, supra note 14, § 7.2[1], [2]. Compare, e.g., Ryerson v. Brown, 35
Mich. 333 (1877) (narrow view) with Great Falls Mfg. Co. v. Fernald, 47 N.H. 444
(1867) (broad view).
22. E.g., Arnsperger v. Crawford, 101 Md. 247, 253, 61 A. 413; 415 (1905).
23. Bloodgood v. Mohawk & Hudson R.R., 18 Wend. 9, 56-62 (N.Y. 1837) (Tracy, J.,
concurring).
24. E.g., Sadler v. Langham, 34 Ala. 311, 333 (1859); Ryerson v. Brown, 35 Mich. 333,
338 (1877); In.re Niagara Falls, 108 N.Y. 375, 380, 15 N.E. 429, 432 (1888).
25. Requiem, supra note 16, at 614. "Doubtless the doctrine will continue to be
evoked nostalgically in dicta and may even be employed authoritatively in rare,
atypical situations. Kinder hands, however, would accord it the permanent inter-
ment in the digests that is so long overdue." Id But see note 28 and accompany-
ing text infra.
26. 240 U.S. 30 (1916). In Mount Vernon, an Alabama statute provided for the con-
demnation of property for water power facilities. Id at 31. The United States
Supreme Court held that this state law did not violate the due process prohibition
against private takings. Id at 33.
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priate test. While a few courts still adhere to the strictures of the
narrow view, 2s most are vehement in refuting its soundness in favor of
the broad view.29
The broad view of public use developed simultaneously with the
narrow view.3" Under the broad view property can be taken by emi-
nent domain if it is to be devoted to a use that benefits the public.3
The public benefit test has been accepted by numerous courts32 and is
the majority view.3
The Supreme Court's silence has done as much to contribute to the
proliferation of the broad view as its decision in Mount Vernon did for
the decline of the narrow view. Considerable deference has been
granted by the High Court to state court determinations as to the con-
stitutionality of legislatively authorized condemnations. 34 Neverthe-
less, departing from its prior reluctance to review such cases, in an 1896
case, Missouri Pactc Railway Co. v. Nebraska,35 the Court for the first
time raised the unconstitutionality of takings for private use.36 In that
case, a Nebraska state agency had ordered a railroad company to allow
27. Id at 32. "The inadequacy of use by the general public as a universal test is
established." Id
28. E.g., Edens v. City of Columbia, 228 S.C. 563, 91 S.E.2d 280 (1956); Phillips v.
Foster, 215 Va. 543, 211 S.E.2d 93 (1975). In Phillps, the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia held that a taking to drain private land was not for public use because the
determinative issue was the predominance of public use and not public benefit.
Id at 543-44, 211 S.E.2d at 94. In Edens, a redevelopment law provided for the
condemnation of a slum area for conversion into an industrial and commercial
sector. 228 S.C. at 567, 91 S.E.2d at 280. Judge Stukes, for the Supreme Court of
South Carolina, rejected execution of the plan because under state law, public use
meant use by the public. Id at 571, 91 S.E.2d at 283. Although a similar condem-
nation was upheld by the United States Supreme Court in Berman v. Parker, 348
U.S. 26 (1954), the South Carolina court stated that the High Court's concept of
public use was different than the view adopted by that state. 228 S.C. at 575, 91
S.E.2d at 285.
29. E.g., Prince George's County v. Collington Crossroads, Inc., 275 Md. 171, 182,
339 A.2d 278, 284 (1975); Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit, 410 Mich.
616, 629-30, 304 N.W.2d 455, 457 (1981) (per curiam).
30. Compare, e.g., Sadler v. Langham, 34 Ala. 311, 334 (1859) and Arnsperger v.
Crawford, 101 Md. 247, 253, 61 A. 413, 415 (1905) (narrow view) with Boston &
Roxbury Mill Dam Corp. v. Newman, 29 Mass. 467, 481 (1832) and Amoskeag
Mfg. Co. v. Head, 56 N.H. 386, 400 (1876), a'd, 113 U.S. 9 (1885) (broad view).
31. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954); 2A NICHOLS, supra note 14, § 7.2[2].
32. See, e.g., Minneapolis v. Wurtele, 291 N.W.2d 386 (Minn. 1980); Cannata v. City
of New York, 11 N.Y.2d 210, 182 N.E.2d 395, 227 N.Y.S.2d 903, appeal dismissed,
371 U.S. 4 (1962).
33. 2A NICHOLS, supra note 14, § 7.2[2].
34. Meidinger, supra note 1, at 31. The Court has not changed this policy. See, e.g.,
TVA v. Two Tracts of Land, 387 F. Supp 319 (E.D. Tenn. 1974), afl'd, 532 F.2d
1083 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 827 (1976); Courtesy Sandwich Shop, Inc. v.
Port of New York Auth., 12 N.Y.2d 379, 190 N.E.2d 402, 240 N.Y.S.2d 1, appeal
dismissed, 375 U.S. 78 (1963).
35. 164 U.S. 403 (1896).
36. Id at 416. The Court raised the due process private taking issue sua sponte. Id at
417.
Baltimore Law Review
a group of farmers to erect a grain elevator near its tracks.37 Justice
Gray, for the Court, stated that the order, compelling surrender of an
estate in land to a private association, was a taking of property from the
railroad for the private use of business, in violation of the fourteenth
amendment due process clause.3" The Court observed that the associa-
tion was neither incorporated for a public purpose nor constructing the
elevator for general public use.39 Unfortunately, Justice Gray did not
expand on the precise test employed to invalidate the state action. Mis-
souri Pacific, therefore, stands as an apparent anomaly in eminent do-
main law.40 Since that decision over eighty-five years ago, the Supreme
Court has not invoked the public use doctrine to invalidate a state con-
demnation for the benefit of private business.4
The broad versus narrow view debate has not helped in focusing
on a clear definition of public use. The practical consequences of ap-
plying one view or the other have been minor because, for any given set
of circumstances, both tests are unworkable.42 Realizing the inade-
quacy of either approach, legal commentators have instead analyzed
the history of particular public uses.
C. Infrastructure and Urban Development
Since colonial times, takings which have been essential for the
public welfare have been routinely upheld as public uses, despite the
benefit to private persons or businesses. The transportation and indus-
trial network of the United States has, for the most part, been a product
of private corporate development. Because courts believed that the
sovereign power of eminent domain could be delegated to private inter-
ests when they provided services essential to citizens, takings were con-
sidered for public use despite substantial private benefit. Without
condemnation authority, the infrastructure 3 vital to an industrialized
society could never have been built in the American capital economy.
One of the earliest examples of takings by private interests for in-
37. Id at 416.
38. Id at 417.
39. Id
40. The fifth amendment was not a basis for finding the proposed taking in Missouri
Pac~ic unconstitutional. Direct application of this provision of the Bill of Rights
to the states was rejected by the Court in Baron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 247
(1833). It was not until the Court's 1897 Term that the fifth amendment was ap-
plied directly to the states through the fourteenth amendment due process clause.
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 236 (1897). Had
Missouri Pac/ic been decided a year later under the incorporation theory, it might
have had greater precedential value.
41. Berger, supra note 3, at 213.
42. 2A NICHOLS, supra note 14, § 7.2[3]; Berger, supra note 3, at 208; Meidinger, supra
note 1, at 24.
43. "Infrastructure" in this context means major transportation arteries such as rail-
ways, highways, and intercoastal waterway facilities. The term also includes en-
ergy production and transport systems. See Meidinger, supra note 1, at 23-33, 37-
41.
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dustrial development was the mill acts.' Prior to the American
Revolution, the mill acts ermitted a lower riparian to build a dam to
supply power for a mill.4FIf, as a result of such action, the land of an
upper riparian was flooded, the lower could only be assessed dam-
ages.46 By limiting the remedy to damages the law, in effect, gave the
mill owner the right of private condemnation.47 When courts began to
address the public use requirement, mill acts were occasionally struck
down under the narrow view4" but, more often, were upheld by courts
applying the broad public benefit test.49 The mill acts were significant
in the history of public use because they were the forerunners of mod-
em legislation giving public utilities condemnation authority.50 More-
over, they were the first statutes that permitted private businesses to
condemn property notwithstanding the public use limitation.5'
Another body of statutes that enabled a private individual to con-
demn property were the landlocked owner laws.52 These laws allowed
the owner of a landlocked parcel to build a road through the land of an
adjacent owner to gain access to a public highway.5 3 Federal and state
governments in the young American republic could not provide roads
in step with the westward expansion and conversion of wilderness to
productive use.5 4 Landlocked owner laws encountered some chal-
lenges under the public use limitation but were generally upheld. 55
This legislation could have played a more important role in the history
of public use had it not been for the eventual supremacy of the rail-
roads in the American economy during the 1900's.
Railroad companies dominated the transportation industry and
consequently took precedence in the delegated exercise of eminent do--6
main. They used condemnation authority with unparalleled speed
and frequency.57 In every jurisdiction where the use of eminent do-
44. 2A NICHOLS, supra note 14, § 7.623. All of the state mill acts effective in 1885 are
listed in Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 9, 17-18 (1885).
45. 2A NICHOLS, supra note 14, § 7.623.
46. Id
47. Berger, supra note 3, at 206.
48. Eg., Loughbridge v. Harris, 42 Ga. 500 (1871); Ryerson v. Brown, 35 Mich. 333
(1877); Tyler v. Beacher, 44 Vt. 648 (1871) (mill acts held unconstitutional).
49. E.g., Hazen v. Essex Co., 66 Mass. 475 (1853); Great Falls Mfg. Co. v. Fernald, 47
N.H. 444 (1867); Scudder v. Trenton Falls, 1 N.J. Eq. 694 (1832) (mill acts upheld
as providing public benefit).
50. Berger, supra note 3, at 206-07.
51. Id
52. 2A NICHOLS, supra note 14, § 7.626.
53. Berger, supra note 3, at 207.
54. Requiem, supra note 16, at 601.
55. Compare, e.g., County of Madera v. Raymond Granite Co., 139 Cal. 128, 72 P.
915 (1903); Brewer v. Bowman, 9 Ga. 37 (1850) and Robinson v. Swope, 75 Ky. 21
(1876) (upholding private way laws) with Logan v. Stogdale, 123 Ind. 372, 24 N.E.
135 (1890); Welton v. Dickson, 38 Neb. 767, 57 N.W. 559 (1894) and Taylor v.
Porter, 4 Hill 140 (N.Y. 1843) (invalidating private way laws).
56. Meidinger, supra note 1, at 26-27.
57. E.g., Swan v. Williams, 2 Mich. 427 (1852); Concord R.R. v. Greely, 17 N.H. 47
19821 Eminent Domain
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main by the railroads was contested, the delegation of state power was
upheld. 8 Without condemnation authority, railroads certainly could
have never come into existence.59
The demands of new technology necessitated the ever increasing
delegation of condemnation authority. Energy producers in the late
nineteenth century used eminent domain both at the state and regional
levels.6' The need for direct routes and specialized configurations re-
sulted in takings that could not be avoided.6' When the iron horse gave
way to the horseless carriage as the prevailing mode of commerce, the
exercise of eminent domain shifted to the construction of turnpikes.62
In addition, the shorelines of intercoastal waterways were subjected to
condemnation for the development of canals and harbor facilities. 63 In
summary, condemnations for instrumentalities of commerce were regu-
larly upheld, despite the degree of private control, because of the antic-
ipated public benefit.
From the turn of the century to modern times, eminent domain
has been utilized in increasingly sophisticated and comprehensive
projects, characterized by the cooperative efforts of government and in-
dustry. Their combined activities have had the greatest impact, how-
ever, in the field of urban development. Although examination by the
judicial branch into urban revitalization schemes started over a hun-
dred years ago, 64 state and federal judiciaries did not acknowledge ur-
ban renewal as a distinct body of law until the social reforms of the
thirties evidenced a commitment to the eradication of urban blight.65
Until the Supreme Court's 1954 landmark decision in Berman v.
(1845); State v. Snohomish County Court, 68 Wash. 572, 123 P. 996 (1912). For
citation to numerous cases in which condemnations by the railroads were con-
tested and upheld, see 2A NICHOLS, supra note 14, § 7.521.
58. 2A NICHOLS, supra note 14, § 7.521.
59. Berger, supra note 3, at 208.
60. 2A NICHOLS, supra note 14, § 7.522 (light and electricity), id § 7.523 (gas and
petroleum). The expansion of public utilities made the mill acts obsolete. Mei-
dinger, supra note 1, at 32.
61. See Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit, 416 Mich. 616, 678, 304 N.W.2d
455, 479 (1981) (Ryan, J., dissenting).
62. E.g., Rindge Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700 (1923).
63. E.g., Marchant v. City of Baltimore, 146 Md. 513, 126 A. 884 (1924) (Baltimore
harbor project); Rogers v. Bradshaw, 20 Johns. 735 (N.Y. 1823) (Erie Canal
project).
64. Meidinger, supra note 1, at 33. The first case to deal with slum clearance and the
public use limitation on eminent domain was Dingley v. Boston, 100 Mass. 544
(1868). In Dingley, a state law provided for the taking of urban areas to abate
nuisances for the preservation of public health. Id at 547-50. The Supreme Judi-
cial Court of Massachusetts upheld the act because it provided for a use that was
"unquestionably" public. Id at 553.
65. New York Housing Authority v. Muller, 270 N.Y. 333, 1 N.E.2d 153 (1936), was
the first case to uphold the condemnation of a slum area for the construction of
low income housing. A year later the United States Congress enacted the Hous-
ing Act of 1937, which authorized federal loans and grants for slum clearance and
public housing construction. Housing Act of 1937, ch. 896, 50 Stat. 888 (1937)
(current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1440 (1976)).
Parker, 66 federal and state urban renewal statutes met with varying de-
grees of success when confronted by the public use limitation.67
In Berman v. Parker,68 the proprietor of a District of Columbia
department store sought to enjoin the condemnation of his property.69
The store, situated in a designated blighted area, was condemned under
a congressional act 70 even though the business was viable.71 Despite
the owner's contention that the act violated the public use requirement
of the fifth amendment,72 the Supreme Court upheld the taking. 3 Jus-
tice Douglas, for the Court, stated that the elimination of crime and
disease, under a comprehensive plan for slum clearance, was a legiti-
mate purpose to be pursued under Congress' plenary power in the na-
tion's capital.74 The scope of judicial review was noted to be extremely
narrow in such cases.75 Answering the contention that redevelopment
by a private corporation violated the public use requirement, the Court
stated as follows:
Once the object is within the authority of Congress the right
to realize it through the exercise of eminent domain is clear.
For the power of eminent domain is merely the means to the
end. . . . Here one of the means chosen is the use of private
enterprise for redevelojpment of the area. Appellants argue
that this makes the project a taking from one businessman for
the benefit of another. . . . The public end may be as well or
better served through an agency of private enterprise than
through a department of government - or so the Congress
might conclude.
76
Berman v. Parker77 is the most influential eminent domain case in
the present era of highly sophisticated infrastructure expansion and
municipal development projects.7" With the notable exception of
66. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
67. Compare Adams v. Housing Auth., 60 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 1952) and Housing Auth.
v. Johnson, 209 Ga. 560, 74 S.E.2d 891 (1953) (condemnations invalidated) with
Gohld Realty Co. v. City of Hartford, 141 Conn. 135, 104 A.2d 365 (1954) and
Papadinis v. City of Somerville, 331 Mass. 627, 121 N.E.2d 714 (1954) (condem-
nations upheld).
68. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
69. Id at 28.
70. District of Columbia Redevelopment Act, ch. 338, 63 Stat. 441 (codified at D.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 5-701 to -719 (1961)).
71. 348 U.S. 26, 30 (1954).
72. Id at 30-31.
73. Id at 35.
74. Id at 31-32. The United States Constitution authorizes Congress to legislate ex-
clusively for the District of Columbia. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 17.
75. 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
76. Id at 32-34 (citations omitted).
77. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
78. Meidinger, supra note 1, at 35-38; see Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent
Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 553, 590 (1972).
19821 Eminent Domain 317
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South Carolina, which has rejected the rationale of Berman,79 most
states have enacted laws that allow condennation for the private devel-
opment of blighted areas.80 Moreover, several jurisdictions have gone
beyond slum clearance and have adopted local development acts that
permit the taking of non-blighted property in non-blighted areas.8 1
These acts figure prominently in programs for private commercial and
industrial stimulation of local economies. Condemnations, pursuant to
these statutes, have created a conflict among the states and generated
the criticism of legal commentators as to whether such takings lie at the
periphery of unconstitutional private use.82
III. THE OUTER LIMITS OF PUBLIC USE
In eminent domain law a growing concern exists that the public
use requirement is in jeopardy. While the general appraisal of its via-
bility as a constitutional restraint is not altogether fatalistic,8 3 an evalu-
ation of the modem case law is not encouraging. Recent opinions and
law review articles have warned that property owners are virtually de-
fenseless against governmental and commercial entities armed with
condemnation authority.8 4 The public benefit test, in their view, has
made takings impervious to attacks based upon the public use limita-
tion.85 Takings are sporadic, swift, and ordinarily result in permanent
deprivations of property.8 6 Finally, some legal writers caution that em-
inent domain may become as much an inherent attribute of corporate
planning as it is of state sovereignty. 7
There are numerous reasons for examining in greater detail the
public use requirement and the role of corporations in the exercise of
eminent domain. The participation of large corporations in the deci-
sion-making process at the executive and legislative levels of govern-
ment could infringe on the property rights of those who are not
considered in a corporation's profit projections. In contrast to corporate
power, the people most frequently affected by takings are often plagued
79. Edens v. City of Columbia, 228 S.C. 563, 573-76, 91 S.E.2d 280, 284-85 (1956).
80. E.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 5-804 (1981); MD. ANN. CODE art. 44A, § 13 (1980); VA.
CODE § 36-27 (1976).
81. E.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 125.1622 (1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 472.01-.02
(West 1978).
82. Opinion of the Justices, 152 Me. 440, 131 A.2d 904 (1957); Hogue v. Port of Seat-
tle, 54 Wash. 2d 799, 341 P.2d 171 (1959); Berger, supra note 3; Meidinger, supra
note 1.
83. Requiem, supra note 16.
84. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 645-46, 304 N.W.2d
455, 464-65 (1981) (Ryan, J., dissenting); Meidinger, supra note 1, at 42.
85. See Meidinger, supra note 1, at 41-42.
86. Id at 41-44.
87. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 683, 304 N.W.2d 455,
481 (1981) (Ryan, J., dissenting). "[W]hen the private corporation to be aided by
eminent domain is. . . large and influential. . . , the power of eminent domain,
for all practical purposes, is in the hands of the private corporation. The munici-
pality is merely the conduit." Id
[Vol. 11
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by poor organization and political impotence.88 Furthermore, judicial
investigation into such takings is restricted because many condemna-
tion hearings are expedited legal proceedings. 89 Finally, victims of
governmental-industrial cooperation may not always be adequately
compensated by the mere receipt of "fair market value" for their prop-
erty.' The following analysis of representative cases, dealing with pri-
vate municipal development and the public use limitation, is
illustrative.
A. Representative Cases
In 1975 the Court of Appeals of Maryland decided Prince George's
County v. Collington Crossroads, Inc. 91 In that case, the county sought
to condemn property for the private development of an employment
center for clean industry.92 County authorities contended that the land
was being taken for the public use of employment diversification and a
larger tax base.93 Maryland's highest court upheld the taking.94 Judge
Eldridge, for the court, noted that the project was too costly to attract
private investment, without initial condemnation and resale. 95 Further-
more, control of the project by the county rendered the taking as one
for public use under the Maryland Constitution.96
Karesh v. City Council of Charleston97 was decided by South Caro-
lina's highest court in 1978. The city, under a contract with the
Holywell Corporation, attempted to condemn commercial property for
88. Comment, State Constitutional Limitations on the Power of Eminent Domain, 77
HARv. L. REV. 717, 719 (1964).
89. Eg., MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 213.51 to .77 (1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 117.042
(West 1976). State legislatures have prescribed various standards by which a mu-
nicipality can acquire property quickly through condemnation; the general re-
quirement is a high degree of public necessity. See, e.g., MICH. COMp. LAWS
§§ 213.51 to .77 (1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 117.042 (West 1976).
90. Fair market value has been held to satisfy the just compensation requirement.
United States v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 275 (1943). Certain costs borne by the
condemnee, however, are not taken into account for valuation purposes, making
fair market value less than adequate compensation.
For example, the taking of the land from its owner may cause him to
suffer many injuries (such as the expenditure of time and money in mov-
ing to another location, or a loss of good will resulting from the enforced
relocation of his business) for which he would not be fully compensated
if his recovery were based entirely on the value of the condemned land
as the word "value" is generally construed by the courts.
1 J. BONBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY 98 (1937).
91. 275 Md. 171, 339 A.2d 278 (1975).
92. Id at 176-79, 339 A.2d at 281-82.
93. Id
94. Id at 190, 339 A.2d at 288.
95. Id at 179-80, 339 A.2d at 283.
96. Id The Maryland Constitution's public use provision provides, "The General
Assembly shall enact no law authorizing property, to be taken for public use,
without just compensation. . . ." MD. CONST. art. III, § 40.
97. 271 S.C. 339, 247 S.E.2d 342 (1978).
the development of a convention center and shopping complex. 98 State
taxpayers sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the
city could not take the property and lease it to a private corporation.99
The court held that such condemnations contravene South Carolina's
Constitution, which mandates that eminent domain can only be au-
thorized for public use."
Kentucky's highest appellate tribunal followed in 1979 with Ow-
ensboro v. McCormick. "oI Taxpayers in that state challenged the con-
stitutionality of a local industrial authority act.' 0 2 The Supreme Court
of Kentucky ruled in favor of the taxpayers. 0 3 Justice Reed, for the
court, held that property could not be condemned for ultimate convey-
ance to private commercial or industrial developers."° Justice Reed
adopted a portion of the intermediate appellate court's opinion, which
simply stated that no public use is involved when the land of one is
condemned merely to enable another to build a factory or shopping
center. 
0 5
In Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit, ' 6 the Supreme
Court of Michigan came to a conclusion that contrasted diametrically
with the ruling of the Owensboro court. 0 7 Poletown attracted consider-
able attention from the local and national media when the residents of
the small Polish-American community tried to stop the leveling of their
homes, shops, and churches under the authority of a municipal devel-
opment act.' 08 The contemplated public use of the condemned five
hundred acre tract was the construction of a General Motors Corpora-
tion "new generation" auto assembly facility. 1°9 General Motors had
informed Detroit authorities that it was closing other plants, which
could not be renovated, resulting in the loss of thousands of jobs to a
city already crippled by severe unemployment. "10 Unless an area meet-
ing the corporation's specifications was found, the new facility would
be built elsewhere. Over the vigorous dissents of Justices Ryan"' and
98. Id at 341, 247 S.E.2d at 343.
99. Id at 341, 247 S.E.2d at 344.
100. Id at 344-45, 247 S.E.2d at 345 (construing S.C. CONST. art. 1, § 13).
101. 581 S.W.2d 3 (Ky. 1979).
102. Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 152-810 to -930 (1970).
103. 581 S.W.2d 3, 8 (Ky. 1979).
104. Id at 7-8.
105. Id at 8 (quoting opinion of intermediate appellate court).
106. 410 Mich. 616, 304 N.W.2d 455 (1981) (per curiam).
107. Compare Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 304 N.W.2d
455 (1981) (per curiam) with Owensboro v. McCormick, 581 S.W.2d 3 (Ky. 1979).
108. Eg, Kelly, The Last Days of Poletown, TIME, Mar. 30, 1981, at 29; Pushing the
Boundaries of Eminent Domain, Bus. WEEK, May 4, 1981, at 174.
109. 410 Mich. 616, 628, 304 N.W.2d 455, 457 (1981) (per curiam).
110. Id at 630-32, 304 N.W.2d at 460.
111. Id at 645-84, 304 N.W.2d at 464-82 (Ryan, J., dissenting). "This is an extraordi-
nary case. The reverberating clang of its economic, sociological, political, and
jurisprudential impact is likely to be heard and felt for generations." Id at 645,
304 N.W.2d at 464. Justice Ryan's Poletown dissent appeared well after the
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Fitzgerald," 2 the majority upheld the act and proposed taking. 13 The
per curiam decision acknowledged the judiciary's limited role and re-
quired deference to the legislature in determining public use." 4
B. Scope of Judicial Review
In reconciling the conflict among states as to the permissible extent
of public use, it is necessary to consider the degree of presumptive va-
lidity granted legislative determinations by state judiciaries. An exami-
nation of the representative cases, as to the measure of deference to be
accorded the respective state assemblies, should provide insight into the
divergent conclusions. The majority in Poletown relied on Berman v.
Parker's"15 expression of the narrow judicial responsibility." 6 "The
United States Supreme Court has held that when a legislature speaks,
the public interest has been declared in terms 'well-nigh conclu-
sive.' "1 7 The Poletown majority further stated that when statutory
procedures are followed in condemnation proceedings, the scope of ju-
dicial review is even more severely restricted."'
In contrast, the two Poletown dissents emphasized the responsibil-
ity of the judiciary. Justice Fitzgerald accorded legislative announce-
ments their due deference, but concluded that public use is ultimately a
judicial question." 9 He noted that conclusive legislative determinations
of public use would result in "outrageous" takings of property benefit-
ing private corporations. 2 0 In Justice Ryan's dissent, he challenged the
majority's reasoning on two fronts. First he traced Michigan law and
concluded that the majority had ignored the greater deference accorded
statutes exercising the taxing and spending power for a public purpose
than those relating to eminent domain for public use.' 2' Ryan next
questioned the majority's reliance on Berman because Justice Douglas'
decision in that case was confined to review of a congressional act by a
federal court, directly applying the fifth amendment in an exclusively
Supreme Court of Michigan reached its 5-2 decision. He delayed writing a sepa-
rate opinion because he believed an adequate discussion of the constitutional is-
sues could not be accomplished in the permitted two-week period. Id The
dissent contains a highly detailed factual account and, more importantly, the eco-
nomic setting of the controversy. Id The role of the nation's largest automobile
corporation in the condemnation of the neighborhood of mostly retired Polish-
American residents is graphically portrayed. Id at 651-60, 304 N.W.2d at 467-71.
112. Id at 636, 304 N.W.2d at 460 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting).
113. Id
114. Id at 632-33, 304 N.W.2d at 459.
115. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
116. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 633, 304 N.W.2d 455,
459 (1981) (per curiam).
117. Id
118. Id
119. Id at 638-39, 304 N.W.2d at 461-62 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting).
120. Id
121. Id at 662-69, 304 N.W.2d at 472-75 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
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federal jurisdiction. 122 Ryan concluded that the Supreme Court's rul-
ing provided no logical support for the proposition that a state court
should accord similar deference to a state legislature in construing its
own constitution.
23
The South Carolina court in Karesh took a strong position on the
presumptive invalidity accorded legislative acts granting condemnation
authority. The court reaffirmed that eminent domain was in deroga-
tion of the fundamental right to hold property in a constitutional sys-
tem.' 24 Strict construction by the court, in accordance with prior South
Carolina case law, compelled invalidation of the proposed taking.
25
Thus, public use in South Carolina is clearly a judicial question.
26
Judicial statements relating to the degree of deference granted leg-
islative bodies do not necessarily explain any court's final ruling. The
representative cases illustrate this point. For example, in Collington
Crossroads, the Court of Appeals of Maryland recognized the judici-
ary's ultimate responsibility for enforcing the constitution's public use
limitation on eminent domain. 127 Nevertheless, the court quoted at
length from several Maryland cases indicating that public use is pri-
marily a legislative determination. 128 This confusing dualism also ap-
peared in the Poletown per curiam opinion. Qualifying the court's
admitted deference to the legislature, the majority stated that the taking
was subjected to the highest level of judicial scrutiny because property
was taken from one person for the benefit of another. 29 Although the
Owensboro court was silent as to the degree of deference granted the
Kentucky legislature, it chided that body for not promulgating suffi-
cient guidelines under the local development act.' 3 Commenting on
judicial reluctance to enter the public use debate, Professor Nichols
stated, "The constitutional protection against the taking of property for
private use cannot be evaded by any colorable declarations that the use
is public however formally and officially made."'1
3'
122. Id at 668, 304 N.W.2d at 475.
123. Id
124. Karesh v. City of Charleston, 271 S.C. 339, 342, 247 S.E.2d 342, 344 (1978) (citing
Young v. Wiggins, 240 S.C. 426, 435, 126 S.E.2d 360, 365 (1962)).
125. See discussion of Edens v. City of Columbia, 228 S.C. 563, 91 S.E.2d 280 (1956),
note 28 supra
126. See id
127. Prince George's County v. Collington Crossroads, Inc., 275 Md. 171, 181, 339
A.2d 278, 283 (1975).
128. Id at 182-89, 339 A.2d at 283-87 (quoting Riden v. Philadelphia, B. & W. R.R.,
182 Md. 336, 342-43, 35 A.2d 99, 102 (1943); VanVitsen v. Gutman, 79 Md. 405,
411-12, 29 A. 608, 610 (1894); New Central Coal v. George's Creek Coal & Iron
Co., 37 Md. 537, 560 (1873)).
129. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 634-35, 304 N.W.2d
455, 459-60 (1981) (per curiam).
130. Owensboro v. McCormick, 581 S.W.2d 3, 4-5 (Ky. 1979).
131. 2A NICHOLS, supra note 14, § 7.4[1].
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C. Distinguishing the Precedent
Similar cases have been cited by courts when confronted with tak-
ings under municipal development laws. The confficting results raise
the issue of the applicability of decisions concerning the taxing and
spending power, slum clearance, and infrastructure development in
condemnations such as those in the representative cases.
1. Taxing and Spending Power
The law of eminent domain uses such terms as public use, public
purpose, and public benefit interchangeably. "Public purpose," how-
ever, is a common constitutional phrase that delineates state taxing and
spending power. 32 The representative cases demonstrate a deep split as
to the propriety of granting legislatures the same degree of discretion in
eminent domain as that granted under the taxing and spending clauses.
In Collington Crossroads, the Court of Appeals of Maryland expressly
recognized the distinction between the exercise of eminent domain and
the power to issue revenue bonds to finance private industrial and com-
mercial projects for a public purpose. 33 Yet the court cited several
bond issuance cases to support its broad interpretation of public use,
justifying condemnation for the private development of an employ-
ment park.
134
The Michigan court in Poletown did not distinguish between the
two powers. In describing the "protean concept of public benefit,"'1
35
the court held the terms public use and public purpose to be synony-
mous. 1 36 A leading Michigan case defining the scope of the taxing and
spending power was cited as direct authority for the General Motors
condemnation. 
37
In contrast to the Maryland court and Poletown majority, the dis-
sents in Poletown displayed opposition to blending the two concepts.
The dissenting justices conceded that public use and public purpose,
within their respective constitutional contexts, had changed and ex-
panded since their adoption. 38 They distinguished the terms, however,
based on the degree to which the taxing and spending power and emi-
132. Eg., Ky. CONST. § 171; MICH. CONST. art. 10, § 2; S.C. CONST. art. X, § 14.
133. Prince George's County v. Collington Crossroads, Inc., 275 Md. 171, 190 n.6, 339
A.2d 278, 288 n.6 (1975).
134. Id at 190, 339 A.2d at 288 (1975) (citing Wilson v. Board of County Comm'rs, 273
Md. 30, 327 A.2d 488 (1974); Lerch v. Maryland Port Auth., 240 Md. 438, 214
A.2d 761 (1965); Frostburg v. Jenkins, 215 Md. 9, 136 A.2d 852 (1957)).
135. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 630, 304 N.W.2d 455,
457 (1981) (per curiam).
136. Id
137. Id (citing Gregory Marina, Inc. v. Detroit, 378 Mich. 364, 144 N.W.2d 503
(1966)).
138. Id at 643, 304 N.W.2d at 463 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting); id at 664, 304 N.W.2d at
473 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
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nent domain impinge upon property rights. 139 "[I]t is one thing to dis-
agree with the purposes for which one's tax money is spent; it is quite
another to be compelled to give up one's land."'
' 40
In Karesh the trial court relied on South Carolina's new finance
and taxation article to uphold the taking.' 4 ' The new section of the
constitution recognized redevelopment by private corporations as a
public purpose, enabling municipalities to incur indebtedness.
42
Holding that the new article was inapplicable to eminent domain cases,
the appellate court observed that no repeal of the public use clause was
intended.
143
The same distinction was made in Owensboro. To support the
proposed condemnation, the city relied on revenue bond cases that af-
firmed the right of local governments to purchase property for private
industrial development.'" Reducing unemployment was a proper
public purpose under the state's taxing and spending power.145 It was
held, however, that this purpose for state expenditure was irrelevant to
condemnation under the local industrial act.' 46 The Owensboro deci-
sion, similar to the dissents in Poletown, distinguished the constitu-
tional requirements of public use for condemnation from public
purpose for taxing and spending:
The opportunity for tyranny, particularly by the self right-
eous, exists in condemnation of private property to a vastly
greater degree than the levy of taxes and expenditure of funds
... .Abuse of the taxing and spending power can be effec-
tively dealt with at the polls while it is difficult for a private
citizen suffering from an abuse of the taking power to recover
property permanently taken from him.'147
2. Slum Clearance and Infrastructure Expansion
Public purpose is a term which describes the objective for which
139. Id
140. Id at 666, 304 N.W.2d at 474 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
Condemnation places the burden of aiding industry on the few, who are
likely to have limited power to protect themselves from the excesses of
legislative enthusiasm for the promotion of industry. The burden of tax-
ation is distributed on the great majority of the population, leading to a
more effective check on the improvident use of public funds. Id at 641-
42, 304 N.W.2d at 463 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting).
141. Karesh v. City of Charleston, 271 S.C. 339, 345, 247 S.E.2d 342, 345 (1978) (citing
S.C. CONST. art. X).
142. Id
143. Id
144. Owensboro v. McCormick, 581 S.W.2d 3, 6 (1979) (citing Dyche v. City of
London, 288 S.W.2d 648 (Ky. 1956); Faulconer v. City of Danville, 313 Ky. 468,
232 S.W.2d 80 (1950)).
145. Id at 6-7.
146. Id (citing Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 152.810-.930 (1970)).
147. Id at 7.
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state police power may be pursued legitimately. 148 Justice Douglas'
opinion in Berman v. Parker149 is replete with the phrase. 5 ° It is not
unusual to find that the conflict concerning the taxing and spending
power is reflected in the debate over the precedential value of slum
clearance law to modern municipal development acts.
In both Karesh and Owensboro, the courts distinguished between
condemnation and conveyance to private developers for slum clearance
and conveyance to private developers for the sole purpose of corporate
development.' 5 ' Although the courts stated that such conveyances
could not be permitted unless the property was blighted, 52 neither de-
cision stated the rationale for elevating the factual distinction to legal
significance. The dissenting opinions in Poletown provide the justifica-
tion missing in Karesh and Owensboro for distinguishing between tak-
ings for slum clearance and condemnations solely for the derivative
public benefits of private corporate development. Criticizing the major-
ity's reliance on Michigan slum clearance cases, Justice Fitzgerald
noted that in urban renewal law the public use served by condemnation
occurs when the slum is eliminated, not when the property is conveyed
to private developers.' 53 Eradication of blight, he observed, was the
controlling public use justifying eminent domain.' 54 On the other
hand, in Poletown, it would not be until General Motors developed the
property that the controlling public use of relieving unemployment
could be realized."' Justice Ryan agreed with this reasoning and cau-
tioned that it was an extreme departure from precedent to link the pub-
lic benefit directly with the corporation's private ownership and the
complete supervision of its board of directors.'
56
The legal validity of distinguishing the slum clearance cases cited
in Owensboro, Karesh, and Poletown is questionable. The public use
achieved in urban renewal is the elimination of blight. Yet, vacant lots
serve no public purpose in any comprehensive plan and cannot alone
be considered as legitimate objectives of state police power. Elimina-
tion of slum conditions may be the controlling purpose of slum clear-
ance, but not without a commensurate expectation of redevelopment,
often placed in the hands of private corporations. 157
In Collington Crossroads, the Court of Appeals of Maryland relied
on infrastructure development law rather than slum clearance decisions
148. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954)..
149. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
150. Id at 33, 35.
151. Compare Owensboro v. McCormick, 581 S.W.2d 3, 7 (Ky. 1979) with Karesh v.
City of Charleston, 271 S.C. 339, 345, 247 S.E.2d 342, 345 (1978).
152. Id
153. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 640, 304 N.W.2d 455,
462 (1981) (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting).
154. Id
155. Id
156. Id at 674, 304 N.W.2d at 477 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
157. See note 186 infra.
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as precedent. The proposed condemnation in that case was supported
by a prior decision, Marchant v. City of Baltimore. 158 In Marchant,
land was condemned along the Patapsco River under a plan to expand
privately operated harbor facilities serving the port of Baltimore.1 59
Although the Colling/on Crossroads court suggested the illogic of per-
mitting Baltimore City's condemnation along the river while rejecting
Prince George's County's condemnation near two major highways,"6°
the precedential value of Marchant was questionable. In Marchant, the
public use served by the taking was the extension of harbor service for
a major intercoastal waterway.' 6' The contemplated public use in Col-
lington Crossroads, however, was employment diversification rather
than transportation, industrial, or commerical development. 62
The Maryland court's almost exclusive reliance on infrastructure
cases is unique. In Karesh and Owensboro, for example, the appellate
tribunals did not deal with infrastructure cases in rejecting the pro-
posed takings. Furthermore, the Poletown majority merely indicated
that the condemnation on behalf of General Motors was within the
general bounds of Michigan eminent domain law, including infrastruc-
ture decisions. 63 Justice Ryan, in his dissent, noted that condemnation
for the purpose of infrastructure development falls within the instru-
mentality of commerce exception to the public use limitation.'1 He
viewed the Poletown taking, the purpose of which was unemployment
relief, as clearly outside this universally recognized exception. 65
158. 146 Md. 513, 126 A. 884 (1924).
159. Id at 520-21, 126 A. at 887.
160. Prince George's County v. Collington Crossroads, Inc., 275 Md. 171, 190-91, 339
A.2d 278, 288-89 (1975).
To say that Prince George's County may not accomplish these purposes
[of providing employment opportunities as well as general economic
benefit] by condemning land for the establishment of certain desired
types of private businesses in an industrial park along its major high-
ways, whereas the City of Baltimore can accomplish the same purposes
by condemning land for private businesses along its waterway, would be
wholly illogical.
Id (citations omitted).
161. 146 Md. 513, 521, 126 A. 884, 887 (1924).
162. Prince George's County v. Collington Crossroads, Inc., 275 Md. 171, 189-90, 339
A.2d 278, 288 (1975). Maryland's highest court was aware of the departure taken
in Collington Crossroads from prior decisions: "None of the cases in this Court
applying [the Maryland public use provision] have involved condemnations of
land for industrial or commercial purposes in contexts other than those associated
with railroads, public utilities, or port development." Id
163. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 634, 304 N.W.2d 455,
459 (1981) (per curiam).
164. Id at 672, 304 N.W.2d at 476 (Ryan, J., dissenting). "That a taking of property
for a highway is a taking for public use has been universally recognized from time
immemorial." Id (quoting Rindge Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700,
706 (1923)).
165. Id at 672, 304 N.W.2d at 477 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
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IV. PRESCRIPTION FOR REEVALUATION
Within the last few years jurists and legal commentators, cognizant
of the dwindling constitutional protection of public use provisions,
have offered various guidelines to raise the level of judicial scrutiny in
condemnation cases. Their proposals are particularly sensitive to tak-
ings that benefit private corporations. The tests proposed by Lawrence
Berger,' 66 Errol Meidinger 167 and Justice Ryan of Michigan 68 repre-
sent the most recent and well reasoned approaches to this issue. While
all three have their differences, similarities, and limitations, any one of
them is preferable to the outcome determinative analysis adopted in the
recent cases upholding condemnation to promote corporate
development.
Writing in 1979, Lawrence Berger suggested that courts weigh
three factors to reconcile the public need for private enterprises with
the right of the individual to own property. The first factor would
weigh in favor of takings promoting economic efficiency and the opti-
mum use of resources.' 69 The second consideration would be the net
increase in the value of the property after the condemnation. 70 The
third factor would be whether the public benefit sufficiently outweighed
the loss to be borne by the condemnee.' 7' An affirmative burden of
proof would rest on the condemning authority. 72 Although Berger
recognized that courts have utilized all the aforementioned considera-
tions, he noted that the factors had never been applied in a formal and
systematic manner.
173
Responding to Berger's approach a year later, Errol Meidinger
suggested that Berger's factors would do little to help the private prop-
erty owner and could actually result in an increased number of tak-
ings. 174 Meidinger joined Berger in criticizing the traditional public
benefit test, but proposed a stricter test to solve the problem of indis-
criminate takings. 75 Two elements figure prominently in Meidinger's
test. The first is that the public necessity for a particular condemnation
must be conclusively established. 176 Secondly, the condemnation must
result in the least private injury to the condemnee for the greatest pub-
166. Berger, supra note 3, at 237-46.
167. Meidinger, supra note 1, at 43-49.
168. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 645, 304 N.W.2d 455,
465 (1981) (Ryan, J., dissenting).
169. Berger, supra note 3, at 239-40.
170. Id at 240-41. Berger described this element as a "monopoly" factor. Id
171. Id at 241-43.
172. Id at 223-25.
173. Id One of the principal benefits of the Berger test would be greater predictability.
Berger does point out that errors in the suggested calculations would likely favor
the condemning authority. Id
174. Meidinger, supra note 1, at 52.




lic good.' 7 7 Despite the differences in Meidinger's and Berger's at-
tempts to raise the level of judicial scrutiny, apparently both concur
that the interests of all the parties involved should be balanced.
Justice Ryan in his Poletown dissent also suggested that a balanc-
ing test should be applied when condemnations are sought on behalf of
private corporations. The Poletown majority employed a traditional
broad view of public use, which they defined as the "protean concept of
public benefit."' 78 In dissent, Ryan proposed a test requiring the pres-
ence of three factors to satisfy the public use limitations. 179 The first
factor, "extreme public necessity otherwise impracticable," 80 would re-
quire the indispensability of eminent domain to the very existence of
corporate enterprises vital to the public.' 8 ' "With regard to highways,
railroads, canals, and other instrumentalities of commerce, it takes little
imagination to recognize that without eminent domain these essential
improvements, all of which require particular configurations of prop-
erty - narrow and generally straight ribbons of land - would be
'otherwise impracticable'; they would not exist at all."' 8 2 The second
factor in Ryan's test is some form of governmental control over the
project after condemnation, during its private operation. 8 3 Public ac-
countability, Ryan noted, is an element that has traditionally justified
takings for private corporations, under the theory that these corpora-
tions are acting as public agents. 84 For example, railroads and public
utilities are highly regulated industries, which must provide services
without discrimination.' The third requirement Justice Ryan be-
lieved necessary to condone condemnations aiding private corporations
177. Id at 45.
178. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 630, 304 N.W.2d 455,
457 (1981) (per curiam).
179. Id at 674-75, 304 N.W.2d at 478 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
180. Id at 675, 304 N.W.2d at 478. This factor applies to slum clearance and all cate-
gories of infrastructure (instrumentalities of commerce and public utilities). Id
Unfortunately the dissent did not expand upon who should make the determina-
tion of extreme public necessity. Clearly the Michigan legislature and local au-
thorities saw the public necessity in Detroit as unemployment relief. The
impracticability element, arguably, was satisfied by the selection of Poletown as
the only appropriate site fulfilling the needs of General Motors.
181. Id
182. Id at 675-76, 304 N.W.2d at 478 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
183. Id at 677, 304 N.W.2d at 479.
184. Id at 679, 304 N.W.2d at 479-80.
185. Meidinger, supra note 1, at 22. Governmental control was the second major con-
sideration in Collinglon Crossroads justifying the taking. Prince George's County
v. Collington Crossroads, Inc., 275 Md. 171, 180, 339 A.2d 278, 283 (1975). The
word "control" was perhaps too strong a characterization of the county's relation-
ship with the private development. Prince George's County's prohibition against
"nuisances and hazards" placed no greater restrictions on the developers than
those that would have existed if the land had been sold without initial condemna-
tion. Id Moreover, "clean" industrial development was not the type of activity
that would disrupt the area's environmental quality. Although the county re-
quired a certain percentage of the land to remain undeveloped, the open space
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is that site selection must be made without reference to the corpora-
tions' interests. 186 The presence of a corporation's "guiding hand"'
'8 7
behind any proposed condemnation is an alarming concept. Evidence
of manipulation of municipal governments should make any taking on
a corporation's behalf inherently suspect and presumptively invalid. 88
provision provided for private ownership of the land, including a privately main-
tained golf course. Id
An important issue raised in Justice Ryan's dissent, which was left unan-
swered, was the applicability of "public accountability" to slum clearance. Once
developers have accomplished the objectives of a comprehensive plan, they nor-
mally operate as private owners. See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 30
(1954). However, the liability of such private owners under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(Supp. IV 1980), for deprivation of constitutionally protected rights, suggests that
state involvement entails some degree of public accountability. See Male v. Cross-
roads Assocs., 469 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1972).
186. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 680, 304 N.W.2d 453,
480 (1981) (Ryan, J., dissenting). Justice Ryan's third factor, independent site
selection, requires condemnation site selection to be dependent upon considera-
tions separate from corporate interests. Id For example, the path of a railroad is
determined by topography, demography, and technology. Id These factors,
however, are not necessarily independent of a railroad company's interest. Once
the public need for a railroad has been established, these same considerations,
essential to efficient operation, are also taken into account to assure maximum
profits.
Justice Ryan also applied independent site selection to urban renewal. Id
Slum clearance takings, he noted, are based upon an initial determination that an
area is blighted, without reference to the needs of repurchasing develcpers. Id
Such a condemnation, however, would not proceed without the initial determina-
tion of the feasibility of commercial redevelopment. See Berman v. Parker, 348
U.S. 26, 32-33 (1954).
Justice Fitzgerald in his Poletown dissent distinguished Collington Crossroads
and another similar case, City of Minneapolis v. Wurtele, 291 N.W.2d 386 (Minn.
1980), from the General Motors taking because in the Maryland and Minnesota
cases, governmental entities rather than corporations had chosen the sites.
Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 643-44, 304 N.W.2d
455, 464 (1981) (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting).
187. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 653, 304 N.W.2d 455,
468 (1981) (Ryan, J., dissenting).
188. City of Minneapolis v. Wurtele, 291 N.W.2d 386 (Minn. 1980). In Wurteie, the
appellants contended that the taking for a municipal development project was
motivated by the private economic interests of the developing corporation and
financing bank. Id at 390. The court stated that a municipality's finding of pub-
lic purpose could be negated by a showing of bad faith or tainted motive. Id
(citing Housing & Redevelopment Auth. v. Shapiro, 297 Minn. 103, 210 N.W.2d
211 (1973)). Justice Peterson, for the Supreme Court of Minnesota, held that the
evidence was inconclusive and indicated that business redevelopment projects re-
quire the involvement and the initiative of private business interests in the com-
munity. Id
In Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Chertkof, 293 Md. 32, 441 A.2d
1044 (1982), the owner of a tract of land bordering on the Patapsco River filed an
action in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the proposed con-
demnation of his property violated the fourteenth amendment. The landowner,
who had leased a portion of the tract to a concrete batching plant, claimed that a
corporation which operated a glass manufacturing facility on an adjacent tract
sought to purchase his land but he refused to sell. He further alleged that Balti-
more City officials and the corporation conspired to include his property in the
Baltimore Law Review
Surely the gravest consequences will result when sovereign powers are
usurped by independent corporate strategists.
Justice Ryan summarized his Poletown dissent by enunciating a
rule of law that would take into account the competing interests of the
government, the public, the corporation, and the private property own-
er in condemnations benefiting private corporations.'8 9 Although ac-
knowledging the competing interests, he would place a special burden
on the condemning authority: "[T]he right to own and occupy land
will not be subordinated to private corporate interests unless the use of
the land condemned by or for the corporation is invested with public
attributes sufficient to fairly deem the corporate activity
governmental." 90
V. CONCLUSION
Infrastructure development is essential to an industrialized society.
It is generally accepted that if states had not delegated eminent domain
authority to private corporations, a relatively small group of individu-
als could have prevented establishment of the American transporta-
tion-industrial network. The theory under which the constitutional
public use limitation was satisfied was that these private enterprises
provided a public benefit. Subsequently, industrialization had the ad-
verse effect of concentrating the population into large urban centers. In
the twentieth century, urban decay reached catastrophic proportions;
the economy could not respond to the social pressure for relief. With
the aid of condemnation authority, the private economy instilled new
vigor into blighted metropolitan areas.
One of the major social concerns in the United States today is the
paralyzing level of unemployment, particularly in cities. Unemploy-
ment was the focal point in Collington Crossroads, Owensboro, and
Poletown, and at least a consideration before the Karesh court. Yet,
Middle Branch urban renewal plan authorized under the Baltimore City Charter.
Id. at 37, 441 A.2d at 1048. The United States District Court for the District of
Maryland certified ten questions to the Court of Appeals of Maryland because the
pertinent provisions of the City Charter had never been addressed in the state
courts. Id. at 38, 441 A.2d at 1049. Chief Judgt Murphy, for the court, observed:
Although § 15A does not restrict the City's power of condemnation for
genuine urban renewal purposes under § 15, even where such a taking
may culminate in the disposition of the condemned industrial property
to another industrial user for expansion purposes (and result in some
industrial or economic growth), nevertheless if the urban renewal plan
or a part of it is merely a pretext, a ruse, a contrivance to condemn pri-
vate industrial property for the private economic enhancement of an-
other industry, as Chertkof claims, the condemnation, as well as the
offending segment of the urban renewal plan and ordinance, would be in
violation of § 15A.
Id. at 47, 441 A.2d at 1053.
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reconciliation of these cases and their use of precedent is difficult. In
Karesh, the rejection of the proposed condemnation was predictable
for two reasons. First, South Carolina had rejected the rationale of
Berman v. Parker191 and, second, the court had long adhered to a strict
definition of public use. The Supreme Court of Kentucky, in Owens-
boro, refused to allow condemnation under the state's municipal devel-
opment law because it went beyond the scope of public use. The strict
view of public use was predicated upon a narrow interpretation of pre-
cedent and a refusal to analogize distinct police powers because of the
potential for serious abuse unique to eminent domain. The Court of
Appeals of Maryland presented a more pragmatic view of precedent
when it addressed the issue of condemnation to promote employment
through commercial development. Such an expansive reading of pub-
lic use was possible when the traditional public benefit test was applied.
Michigan's high court took essentially the same approach.
Although of no legal consequence, there is a fundamental differ-
ence between the Michigan and Maryland decisions. In Collington
Crossroads, the condemnee was an incorporeal entity, a corporation.
On the other hand, in Poletown, the condemnees were elderly residents
of a picturesque American ethnic community. The apparent victimiza-
tion of Pole/own captured the attention of the nation, lawyer and lay-
man alike. Justice Ryan, in his dissent, did not understate the
calamitous unemployment in Detroit. Yet, he was unable to reconcile
General Motor's condemnation of Poleown with the constitutional
prohibition against takings for private use.
Certainly no one can question the sincerity of state and local au-
thorities attempting to alleviate economic ills. Reducing the number of
people on unemployment rolls is a legitimate objective of the states'
police power. But condemnations serving private corporate interests,
with the derivative effect of stimulating local economies, is not an ordi-
nary means to serve that worthy end. All corporate undertakings nor-
mally benefit the public to some extent. It is one of the axioms upon
which a free enterprise system is based. In the past, however, only
those undertakings that had risen to the level of governmental responsi-
bility were afforded eminent domain authority. In keeping with this
precedent, the determinative issue should be whether corporate viabil-
ity has, in and of itself, become a responsibility of government.
Rocco C Nunzio
191. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
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